tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN June 6, 2014 1:00pm-3:01pm EDT
have become increasingly violent, increasingly heavily armed, and actively targeting and killing ukrainian security forces. so you can't have it both ways. you can't on the one hand purport to take steps to de-escalate the crisis but at the same time under the surface actually take steps to accelerate it. so it's vitally important we continue to keep the pressure on russia to change course and that's exactly what happened this week in europe at the g-7 and in the president's meeting with his european counterparts. president obama secured commitments from our partners to continue coordinated actions to raise the cost of russia's unacceptable interference from ukraine and most importantly, to affirm their readiness to implement sig yant additional measure to impose further costs on russia if it proves necessary. wee also been making clear what it is russia needs to do and what it must stop doing in order
to meaningfully de-escalate the crisis and provide an opportunity to move forward diplomatically. it has to recognize the results of the election and engage directly with the government of ukraine. it needs to completely withdraw its military forces from the border area, stop the flow of militants and weapons across the border, exercise influence among armed separatists, renounce violence, resolve their differences peacefully and, of course, in terms of what it can't do, no military intervention. if russia takes these steps it's equally important that ukraine respond in an appropriate manner. the president-elect has a plan for what he calls peace, unity, and reform. it includes things like pursuing the national dialogue, a cease-fire, decentralization, amnesty for those who put down their weapons and drawing separatists into the political
process. ukraine should pursue those steps. it should avoid having to pursue martial law, disproportionate use of force, or full-scale counterterrorism operations again if russia takes the important steps i outlined to meaningfully de-escalate. ukraine needs to continue to pursue political and economic reforms, especially anti-corruption. let's not forget what we started with. what's really at the root of so much of the turmoil in ukraine is this profound sense of disinfranchisement from the country that's fueled in large part by the gross corruption that we've seen over the past decades and, of course, it needs to implement the imf reform program that is so critical to its near-term success. let me conclude just with a couple words about relations with russia and then we can throw it open for questions or comments. throughout this crisis diplomatic relations with russia have not ceased. we've remained in contact. the president has spoken to
president putin a number of times and, indeed, this he spoke today in normandy. we have tried to make clear repeatedly that our objective is not to weaken russia, not to contain russia, it's not to deny russia's relationship with ukraine. rather, it's to joup hold is very basic principle. ukraine's people must be decided by the people of ukraine, not by russia, not by the united states, not by europe, not by anyone other than the ukrainians themselves. as fiona knows better than anyone, president putin tends to see the relationship with us and with the west on the basis of two decades of pent up grievances. alleged broken promises regarding nato enlargement, missile defense, the use of force in kosovo and libya. he seems to believe we want to keep russia weak and guided, that nato is aimed at russia. from our perspective, none of these things, of course, are true and none are objectives, and ironically the very things
that president putin claims to fear are likely to be precipitated by the actions that russia has taken. they risk being putin-fulfilling prophecies. the president was very clear in brussels in march. as he put it, since the end of the cold war, successful administrations have worked with russia to build ties not as a favor to russia but because it was in our national interest. we continue to believe it's in the world's interest for russia and the united states and all of europe to work constructively together. it's hard to imagine most of the major 21st century challenges being effectively addressed absent that kind of cooperation and already we've clearly demonstrated the possibilities of cooperation through new start, through wto accession by russia, through the effort to remove chemical weapons from
syria, the transit of our troops and material to and from afghanistan, and counterterrorism cooperation after the boston marathon bombings and in advance of the sochi olympics. so going forward there is a way to get back to a more productive path. if russia will de-escalate tensions over ukraine by the steps that i discussed previously, if they work to find a diplomatic way forward that respects and restores ukraine's sovereignty and resets the relationship between russia and ukraine, there is a basis for moving forward. we can continue cooperation where it's in our mutual self-interest on counterterrorism, on nuclear security, in space, on iran, and we can work together to try to overcome old, outdated suspicions and rebuild trust. that is certainly the path that the united states would prefer to take. the question is, is that the path that president putin wants to take and in the coming weeks and months, we'll find the answer. thank you very much.
[ applause ] >> as tony is getting miced up, i'd like to start with some of the questions from the floor. ambassador had raised his hand first and then the gentleman over here. i'll get over to you as well. do you mind taking just a few questions? >> no. >> and then i'll let you respond. or comments as well. >> thank you, tony. i feel very comfortable with what you sketched out in terms of the policy approach. i have one question on how we should deal with russia. when i was in ukraine, as you know, for the last several weeks, i heard ukrainian leaders say to me repeatedly that
ukraine should not be left alone in facing russia, that they felt too weak to handle future negotiations with russia alone. obviously the question came up all the time, what about geneva two? what about a repetition of this international effort? and should that happen? and if so, do you think it could be turned into a process to accompany ukraine on their way forward? >> thank you. identify yourself. >> my name is irvin with the russian news agency and my question is president obama traveled to europe on tuesday, and since then he took part in a number of very important events. just to mention a few, the g-7
summit in brussels, and the bilateral meetings that took place today in particular in normandy. so the question is do you see any changes in the overall swaying around ukraine and dealing with russia, taking into caner account all these events, or are we on the same spot as a week ago. thank you. >> thanks. i'm going to try to take as many questions as i can and then give you the time. here, please. the former georgian ambassador. >> i have $1 billion question.
when the senator biden and yourself initiated the $1 billion assistance to georgia it was very clear and crucial for georgia to remove the consequences of the war with russia and just recently also the president announced the $1 billion security fund for the europe. so could you add a little more specific what is this fund will be dedicated to? thank you. >> thank you. and jeff goldstein and then we'll come down here. thanks. >> thank you. jeff goldstein from the open society foundations. following up on the ambassador's question, i understand that the administration will request $1 billion in extra appropriations from congress for this initiative. will the administration also request a new appropriation for nonsecurity assistance to ukraine as was done for georgia after the war with russia? >> thanks. could you pass the microphone to the lady in front of you? >> american correspondent in
berlin and author. i would like to ask you just to say a few words about how you assess cooperation in responding to putin's actions with the europeans in general and with germany in particular. >> somebody else had their hand up. here. thank you. and then we'll go back to tony. >> kind of follows up on the last question. in terms of cooperation with the europeans, how concerned are you that you have five months until the weather gets cold and you might -- because you talked about a jolt but arguably we could have the crises in early 2006 and 2009 should have been jolts as well. so are you concerned that you're seeing europeans flaking off in five months time and what can you do in five months? thanks.
>> i think you have plenty of questions to respond to in five minutes or less. >> rapid fire. first of all, it's always great to see and i want to thank you for the remarkable service you performed in recent weeks which made a big difference, and with regard to pursuing the geneva track, we're certainly open to that. we've heard the same thing from the ukrainians, a desire to have as they engage with russia the support of the united states, of the key european countries, of the european union and they will certainly have that but we have to decide and define what the best mechanism or process might be but we're fully prepared to continue to engage in that process if that's the best way forward. to the gentleman from tass with regard to the meetings in europe and whether there's any change in the situation. my answer is i hope yes, but we have to judge this not on words but on actions. i think there have been some positive statements that have been made. i think there whas a statement
out of moscow today would referred to the president. but the bottom line is this depends on the actions that are taken, not the words that are spoken. we'll test this in the weeks ahead and our strongest desire and strongest interest is to meaningfully de-escalate and to find a lidiplomatic resolution that we believe profoundly not only can sustain the interests of ukraine, europe, and the united states but also russia. that's what we'd like to achieve. ambassador, with regard to the fund for european security, there are a number of things we would aim to support through this fund and they're critical. the prepositioning of equipment and material in europe, support for more exercises and training missions in europe including central and eastern europe and
direct support to georgia, moldova, and ukraine. we hope this can be a lan list for our countries doing more for themselves. it's not we expect everyone to get to 2% of gdp spending by september, but if we can start to reverse the negative trend, that will be very meaningful. hopefully that fund will help catalyze that. with regard, jeff, to a question of the new appropriation for nonsecurity systems, we're looking carefully what the needs are, what the means are, and whether we need further assistance. i think it's significant that as a result of the leadership that we've exerted, the amount of money being made available to e ukraine is very, very significant. we'll be prepared to look at whether there are gaps that we need to fill on specific types
of assistance going forward. i should emphasize though that this assistance is not going to work if it is not met by a clear dedication to reform on the part of the ukrainian government. we've been down this path before with previous ukrainian governments where the international community proved itself quite generous but the assistance did not produce lasting, meaningful results. we have a strong feeling that this is an exceptionally critical moment but also a moment of real opportunity. because of everything that's happened, because of the commitments that have been made, and, indeed, we see on the mydon a profound desire for change. we'll see if that happens. elizabeth, great to see you here today. with regard to cooperation with in general and germany in
particular, from our vantage point, it has been exceptional. wul of the things that people don't see on a day-to-day basis because it happens behind the scenes is the coordination, communication, cooperation between president obama and his european counterparts. throughout this crisis, he has been on the phone for hours on end particularly with chancellor merkel, president holland, prime minister renzi, with the eu leadership and many others. that process of constant communication starting with the president but then throughout the administration, throughout the departments and agencies, i think has produced exemplary cooperation. now, none of this is easy. there are competing interests among european countries and within european countries. there's obviously the desire for a positive relationship with russia. there are profound economic exists at stake, but at least
from my vantage point, we've managed to remain remarkably united. chancellor merkel has been an extraordinary leader in this effort. her voice and everything that she has done with russia, with her european colleagues, and with us in this situation has been exemplary and i also think it's fair to say that we would not be in the position -- the positive position we're in absent her leadership along with that of other colleagues in europe. and the question is can this be sustained. a good question about going into the winter, different pressures being exerts, and that's a great question. right now my belief is the answer is yes but it also required countries to take significant steps in the coming months to put themselves in a position to sustain and to also be able to resist competing
pressures and influences. you're exactly right. we've had energy jolts before and the jury is out on whether this one will be different. my sense is it will. we had a very, very significant ministerial among the energy ministers in the g-7 in which they agreed to a series of steps that i actually think can advance the ball, including significantly basic stress tests in all of our economies to gauge the extent of our energy security, efficiency, and independence and the results of those tests hopefully will be translated into concrete action to meaningfully diversify sources of energy, supply routes, connections within europe, connections from the united states to europe and elsewhere, but i would acknowledge the jury is out on that. so maybe when we get together at the next annual conference i'll be able to answer the question. >> i will take that, tony, as a commitment that you will be back for the next conference. i have lots of witnesses including c-span. we're very pleased you can join
us today. we know you have a very business agenda and you're going to have to dash out and hope the construction all the way back to the old executive office doesn't hold you up. thank you so much for joining us. >> great to be with you. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> i'd like to thank all of our colleagues here who joined us for the event, to kings college for helping us put this on. and those folks from brookings who did all the hard work. we're really very pleased to see you here. we also look forward to seeing everybody else here at other events and hopefully to welcome with us the o'donnell fellow when they come to brookings. thank you so everyone and let's hope that, indeed, as the question asked, there's a way forward and some interesting and
he vents honoring the anniversary today and we'll bring them all of you tonight beginning at 8:00 eastern beginning at the president obama's speech overlooking omaha beach, one of the landing spots during the invasion. that will be followed by the international ceremony marking the anniversary which take places close to the site of sword beach, another allied landing zone. french president francois hollande spoke at that event. we'll show you our visit to the world war ii memorial on the national mall and we'll hear spechs from past presidents marking d-day. all of that beginning at 8:00 eastern on c-span. a number of members of congress attended that event and a number making statements, those who went and those who didn't, including buck mckeon saying standing on the shore with the men who risked their lives to take this ground among the graves of those who made the ultimate sacrifice, words fail me. also from minority leader nancy pelosi, she says neither our
nation nor any other nation that cherishes the blessings of liberty fought for, pled for, and died for on d-day can ever forget its memory. we want to hear what your thoughts are on the 70th anniversary. join in the conversation at facebook.com/c-span and also on twitter at #chat. >> russia as united states is a nation which believes in its mission, and our missions are pretty similar. we believe in freedom. we believe in distributing our core values, which suddenly disappeared in '90s and 2000s. but it didn't go anywhere, you know, because at our core it was still there, and the biggest national idea for us during all those years was the victory day. that is our main national holiday, and that's what unites
the whole nation is the fight against the fascists. and how it was presented to the nation by president putin is that in ukraine those are western sponsored fascists who came to power, and he illustrated that with flags of former ukrainian liberation army who were allied with us during world war ii, and so he used this to prove that these are fascists who are fighting against both russian and ukrainian nation. so it's misinterpretation that we are looking just to protect russians. no, for the overwhelming majority of russians we are continuing world war ii and we are liberating, really liberating ukraine from the
fascists threat. >> this weekend on c-span a look into politics of putin's russia. on c-span2's book tv live tw two-day coverage of the chicago tribune festival. and the 70th anniversary of d-day beginning saturday morning at 10:30 eastern. >> now a hearing assessing port security. the senate homeland security committee heard from a number of witnesses including assistant secretary for transporter policy and the assistant commandant of the coast guard and officials from u.s. customs and border protection. it's just about two hours.
>> good morning, everyone. we're happen to welcome you today and thank you for joining us. dr. coburn, i have called this hearing, this is a hearing he's had a whole lot of interest in, i have, too, but it's a shared interest, but we want to take a look at the current state of port security in these united states of america. we want to find out if we're headed in the right direction and try to ensure our port security efforts maintain a proper balance between security, safety, and trade facilitation. it's important because our focus as a congress cannot solely be on security but also on maintaining and enhancing our economic competitiveness. as we all know, port security is
no easy job. it involves the maritime security provided by the united states coast guard. men and women patrol our coasts and waterways. it is safeguarded by state and local authorities. it involves the cargo security provided by the u.s. customs and border protection which screens cargo to prevent dangerous goods from entering the united states while also facilitating the flow of trade and transportation. that last part is a particularly important piece, and even as we build and maintain strong layers of port security, we need to take care not to impede transportation or commerce. our ports and waterways are the lifeblood of our economy. i'm told more than 95% of all u.s. trade is handled by our sea ports, 95%.
and these ports account for over 30% of u.s. gross domestic product, more than $5 trillion in trade each and every year. as the former governor of delaware and someone who is ultimately responsible for running a major port, ran that port of wilmington for many years, ran out of money and the state had some money so we took it over when i was governor. this is something i snow a little bit about. the port of wilmington in the northern part of my state is south of philadelphia. the number one seaport of north america for the importation of fresh fruit, bananas and juice concentrate. if you had a banana this morning, it probably came through the port of wilmington. our nickname is the top banana port. it's not just important for the state of delaware where it serves as a key economic engine, it's also a key port for the entire united states. protecting our ports, safeguarding our economic
opportunity is a responsibility we take very seriously. as the government accountability office has noted, port security has come a long way. shortly after 9/11, the maritime transportation security act of 2002 became law and empowered the coast guard with new authorities to ensure commercial vessels in port facilities meet minimum security standards. few years later the safe port act of 2006 authorized key cargo and supply chain security programs enforced by u.s. customs and border protection. since that time these port have taken root. not only that, many of our international trading partners and international trading security organizations have created similar security programs in emulating the department of homeland security's good work but we shouldn't and we can't stop here. i will -- we want to use this hearing as an opportunity to explore how the threat to ports has evolved and what the next steps for dhs should be.
i also don't want to imply there is no room for improvement. as i frequently say, everything i do, i know i can do better. i think that's true for all of us and i think that's true for the way we handle port security. in a recent letter to the congress, jeh johnson indicated he believed the 100% scanning mandate for inbound shipping containers was impractical. if that's the case, we must look for a better way to address security risks while preserving the necessary speed of moving containers through our ports. so i welcome the secretary's pledge to make a good faith effort to improve the department's capabilities without getting in the way of legitimate flow of trade. i look forward to discussing this issue with some of our witnesses today. i also look forward to hearing how the department of homeland security plans to address emerging threats, how it can make programs for effective and efficient, and how the agencies represented here today can work with international organizations and our foreign partners to
raise the global standard for port security. as you can see from our lineup of witnesses, there's. >>ity a lineup. port security is a team sport. a perfect example of why bringing all these agencies together into the department of homeland security was the right thing to do. the components present here today work seamlessly with one another to develop and implement the department's risk-based strategy for port security. from the coast guard to customs, transportation security administration, federal emergency management administration and dhs, each of you play a critical role. we're happy to have gao with us. you've done a lot of work in this area and we're grateful for that. again, thanks to everyone for coming. as dr. coburn knows, we're going to start voting in a little bit and we're going to do one of those deals that we've perfected where voting starts, maybe he
will go vote the first time and when he's done he'll come back and i'll go vote and then we'll swap back and forth and hopefully be able to keep going and make it all work and be done in a punctual way but it's important. we're happy you're here. let me to turn to dr. coburn that thank you for him insisting we have this hearing. >> thank you. first of all, welcome to all of you. this is an interesting area for us to be talking about. sitting on the intelligence committee, our threats are greater, not less, in terms of risk, and getting it right is important. one of the commitments i made to congresswoman janice hahn from l.a., she has the l.a. port which is the biggest, busiest, and has the greatest v vulnerability in terms of a port that we would have this hearing and try to improve what we're doing. so mr. chairman, i'd like unanimous concesent to put her
system in the record. the house is out and we wouldn't have zegeed this hearing at this time had we known that but we did, and i'm happy that we're having the hearing so i would ask unanimous consent to have her testimony included in the record. i'd also note that the house has passed legislation that the senate hadn't seen taken up or considered, the gaps act, and what we need to do is address today to find out where our weaknesses are, what we need to improve it, and as senator carper mentioned, the 100% scanning obviously isn't viable or may not be viable but we need to have a better approach than 2% to 4% scanning that we're seeing today. we know that a successful attack on one of our ports would be devastating. rand corporation gave an example that it could have a $1 trillion effect on our economy. that is a possibility.
we cannot stop every twk that's going to come to this kun but we can make it much more difficult and markedly decrease the likelihood. everybody knows the history of how we came together after 9/11. we created the port security grand program. we mandated 100% cargo screening and the 9/11 commission recommended that as well. we also created the twik card which has had some significant difficulties and is still not implemented. so my goal for this hearing is review all the initiatives that were initially set out, assess how well they're working and whether or not they're working, and determine if our properties are as secure from a potential terrorist attack as we can make them feasibly and economically. i would say we spent $2.8 billion on the port security
grant program with no metrics to measure whether or not we've improved our security. there's no met transso we don't know. we spent $1.2 million on a scanning mandate that we're told will never be met. so there's $5 billion we've spent. we have no assessment of what we've gotten for that money. the twik program was intended to create an i.d. card for transportation workers to enter secure areas including the ports. we'll talk about and sum of my questions will relate to some of the problems associated with that. in general i think it's unclear and hopefully this hearing will help us to know how much improvement we've made in securi securing our parts. i want to thank each of you for
being here and being available and i apologize we will have votes but we will keep this moving as fast as we can. we have i think four votes starting at 11:00. with that, mr. chairman, thank you as well, mr. top banana. >> i have been called worse things. we'll make this work. we appreciate again all of you being here. i'll brief intro douse our witnesses. ellen mclean, deputy assistant secretary for transborder policy at dhs' office of policy. also served as dhs assistant general counsel for enforcement. began her career with the u.s. customs service where she served i believe as septy associate chief counsel, is that right? rear admiral paul thomas joins us from the coast guard where he's assistant commandant for prevention policies, specialist in marine safety, security, and environmental protection. a graduate of the coast guard academy and of the massachusetts
institute of technology where i'm proud to say one of our boys attended. when i went to ohio state i could barely spell m.i.t. congratulations on that. thanks for your service. i want to ask kevin to pronounce your last name for me, kevin. i want to make sure i get it right. >> mcaleenan. if you put an "a" in front of the "c," it works better. mack almcaleenan. leading the agency's port security and trade facilitations operations. >> brian kamoy. he serve as senior director for
preparedly policy on the white house security staff from 2009 to 2013. stephen sadler, the assistant administrator at the tption security administration since october 2011. joined tsa in 2003 and has held several leadership business. spent 25 years in the national commercial maritime industry. stephen caldwell joins us from gao where he's a director, issues on the homeland security justice team. mr. caldwell has over 30 years of experience and has worked on numerous reports on port and supply chain security. thank you all. your entire statements will be made part of the record. i'll ask you to try to stay within five minutes if you could. if you go way over that, we'll
have to rein you in. thank you for joining us. allen, why don't you go ahead. >> good morning, chairman carpenter. i am a career civil servant and testifying before congress for the first time. as this has long been on my career bucket list, i appreciate this opportunity along with my colleagues to testify on a matter of singular porntion to the department, port security. since 2007 and the pass ang of the safe port act, with you now haveself key documents that shape and gad our efforts on port security. the national strategy on global supply chain strategy, the global nuclear detection architecture and the soon to be released the quadrennial homeland security review. dhs is focused on enhancing port security through prevention, protection, and resilience. pursuant to a risk-based approach. while strengthening the global supply chain system, including the maritime transportation network, we are ever mindful
that it is critical to do so by promoting the efficient and secure movement of legitimate goods. guided by the principles in these documents, dhs' approach embraces five elements. one, understanding the risk to better defend and protect against nuclear risks. two, obtaining advance information and using advance targeting techniques. three, increase collaboration with other federal agencies, foreign governments, and private stakeholders. four, implementing strong, domestic security regimes. and, five, promoting preparedness by sustaining grant programs. within this strategic context, dhs can point to several key developments in the past seven years. risk assessments to aid us in understanding the threat environment and prioritization
of resources. significant progress with international and private partners to incorporate risk management principles and leverage trusted trader programs. i'm sorry. the assessment of more than 1500 foreign ports, 200 alone in 2013 under the international port security program. establishment of 360 comprehensive port security plans by port operators, and grant awards to achieve interoperable communications, installation of surveillance cameras at port facilities, and funding for other physical equipment and projects. we face challenges of increased trade from the expansion of the panama canal and increased activity in the arctic. with increasing trade and shifting trade patterns, we must also confront aging infrastructure for a broad range of dhs assets. from coast guard cutters to x ray and radiation and nuclear
detection inspection system. in forging the path for progress, dhs will concentrate on improving information collection, targeting and dissemination, expanding global capacity to secure the supply chain, and addressing risk across all modes of transportation. with a continued focus on enhancing the capabilities of our components and our partners to address current and future challenges to securing our ports, dhs will continue to dedicate substantial attention and resources to implementing a layered risk management approach to security across all transportation pathways in an efficient, and cost-effective way and building essential bipartisanships at home and abro abroad. thank you again for the opportunity to testify about dhs' progress for enhancements on port security. i will be happy to entertain any questions. >> thanks, and we're going to have some. thanks for your testimony.
admiral thomas, please proceed. >> thank you, chairman carper, dr. coburn, and thank you both for your continued support of our coast guard and the opportunity to discuss this really important topic with you this morning. the coast guard in coordination with the other homeland security components implements a maritime system. we want to detect and mitigate threats as far from our shores as possible. we accomplished it through the layered system depicted on the slide before you and displayed to my left. as you can see on the slide, maritime security of u.s. ports does not start and finish in the u.s. rather, the opposite is true. the security of our ports begins in foreign ports at foreign facilities and terminals. this is the first layer of our integrated system. the koets guard's international port security program conducts assessments of foreign ports to ensure they meet international security standards and to build the capacity of our trading partners. so just as you cannot enter u.s.
air space unless the flight originated from an airport that meets minimum security standards you cannot answerer u.s. sea ports unless that voyage originated from a port that meets security standards. the coast guard led foreign port threat assessments brings together information from law enforcement and the intelligence communities to assess the level of crime, terrorist activities, and other factors that may help us determine which threats emanate from those ports. finally, overseas activities boo i our leagues from the customs and border protection and other dhs components help assure the safety and security of people and car go. if you look at the slides, i'll call these the offshore layer. our regulations require that each ship en route to a u.s. port provide the coast guard at least 96 hours advance notice of
arrival. it includes information about the vessel, cargo, crew, and passengers. customs and border protection requires advance notice with information about the cargo, the shipper, the consolidatoconsoli. the center for disease control may also require advance notice. all of this information is collected and shared at both the national and the port level. it's screened and assessed so prior to arrival, the cost guard captain of port has a consolidated assessment of all risks. everything related to safety, security, and the environment. as diverse as invasive species or crew members on a watch list, passengers exhibits signs of illness or damage to the ship that might promise safety or the environment. the captain of port is able to coordinate is single interagency
local, state, and federal risk mitigation plan for each ship that arrives. for the vast majority, local yard nation is necessary to plan the control and inspection. we activate the maritime operational threat response protoco protocols. no some cases the risk will be mitigating by interdicting the case. in other cases the ship is allowed to enter the port but is subjected to inspection and oversight prior to beginning cargo or passenger operations. these boardings are most often led by the coast guard but they may include personnel from other departments or the interagency who can bring their special capabilities to bear on a given threat. in all cases the vessel arrives at a port facility that comply was requirements of the safe port act. these facilities by law have security staff trained to specific standards. they have an access control
system that includes credentials for each employee. they have approved plans in place to prevent and respond to security incidents, and they execute a declaration of security with the foreign trips when appropriate to ensure the communications protocol are clear. beyond the individual port facility, the port community as a whole is prepared and resilient. we're capable of portwide prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities due in large part to the combined impact of investment through our port security grant program, establishment of the area maritime security plans. in summary, mr. chairman, we have used the authorities in the maritime transportation security act and the safe port act to implement a security system that begins in foreign ports, continues in the offshore area as a vessel transits to our waters, and then remains ever vigilant in our ports that have robust interagency, local, state, and federal coordination
to mitigate threats, facilitate commerce and respond to all incidents. thank you. i look forward to your wes. >> you took one second too long. you're off your game today, huh? >> sir. >> actually that's pretty good. very good. thanks for that testimony. kevin, you're up. please proceed. >> good morning. chairman carper, ranking member coburn, it's a privilege to appear before you again today. thanks to your continued support along with effective collaboration with federal, international, and private sector partners, dhs and u.s. customs and border protection have made advancements in maritime cargo security. we've established security partnerships, enhanced targeting and risk assessment programs and invested in advanced technology all essential elements of cvp's multilayered approach to pregnant the nation while expediting legitimate commerce. i'd like to highlight the progress of a few of these efforts for you today. in the first few quers after
ne 9/11, several programs were created to examine shipments and increase the security of the supply chain. the customs trade partnership against terrorism was established in 2010 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. vetted members volunteer to adopt tighter security measures throughout their international supply chain. it's grown from 7 members to over 10,000 members today. the national targeting center also started in 2001 has developed world leading capabilities to assess cargo shipments, crew, and travelers for risk before any laden or board vessels tedestined for th united states. they utilize commercial information and traveler data. we have also strengthened detection equipment capabilities at domestic sea ports.
since 2001 cvp has acquired 1387 radiation portal monitors. these valuable systems have cvp officers defect radiological materials, weapons, and i will lelicit substances. the support of congress has been key. the act codified and made security filings mandatory. building on the 24-hour rule, this program provides cvp advanced insight into the supply chain. the act also codified the cop taner security initiative. under csi, cup works with foreign authorities to identify and examine potentially high risk u.s. bound maritime containers. the 58 csi ports prescene over 80% of all cargo imported into
the united states. cvp will continue to build on our progress. we will continue to refine our targeting to better identify high-risk cargo and we will work to increase the percentage of containers scanned aboard. we'll continue to help lead the effort in developing increasingly effective and sophisticated global standards for cargo security. by utilizing risk-based strategies and applying a multilayered approach we can focus our resources on the small number of goods that are high risk. we improve global supply chain integrity and reduces transaction costs. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. i'm happy to answer your questions. >> all right. thank you for that testimony. brian, welcome. >> thank you, chairman carper, ranking member coburn. i appreciate the opportunity to be with you and to join my colleagues from the department to talk about the port security
grant program which we believe is a critical part of the department's efforts to enhance the security and resilience of our nation's ports. senator coburn, as you mentioned, we've invested mentioned, we invested $2.9 billion since 2002. while i agree with you that we certainly can continue to improve our measurement of both the effectiveness of those investments and our administrative management of the programs, we have clear evidence of the value of these investments across the program's priorities, which include maritime domain awareness. we've invested in over 600 portwide projects that include portwide coordination and collaboration, interoperable communications, surveillance systems that assist in domain awareness. we've invested $161 million just in interoperable communications. we've also invested in improvised explosive device
capabilities and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities. cyber security capabilities, as that threat continues to evolve. planning at the port level, training and exercises and of course the implementation of the transportation worker identification card program. and so in addition to these programatic achievements and, for example, just in vessels that patrol our waterways, we've invested in over 500 vessels. in new york city, for example, the port of new york used over 30 vessels the day hurricane sandy made landfall and rescued over 1,000 people. so we know these dollars are making a difference. and these investments also facilitate increased partnerships, not just at the federal level with my colleagues
here, but at the state and local level and with port owners and operators. we've seen in a variety of instances, you can assure congresswoman hahn that we continue to make investments in the port of los angeles for information sharing and collaboration and, chairman carper, in the port of wilmington, the investments there not just in interoperable communications but in information sharing between the port and the fusion center in delaware that has allowed the building of relationships with state and local law enforcement and the port. i thought i'd also tell you where we are in the fiscal year '14 grant cycle. $100 million was appropriated for the program this year. applications came in on may 23rd. the field reviews, as the admiral mentioned, we work very closely with the coast guard. we have a two-tiered review
process. captains of the port work with the port area and the local and state government through area maritime security committees to prioritize projects. those applications are under that field review right now and will be referred for a national panel review here at the headquarters level later this month and then we expect to announce awards by the end of july. and so i'll close by saying that we look forward to the continuing dialogue about how we can continue to make these investments in the most effective and efficient way possible. we think they have made a real difference and i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> good, thanks. nice job. steve, please proceed. thank you, welcome. >> good morning, chairman carper, ranking member coburn, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify about the twic program. it provides a industry wide
biometric credential to eligible workers requiring unescorted access to port facilities and vessels under the maritime security act of 2002. tsa administers the program jointly with the united states coast guard, tsa is responsible for enrollment, security threat assessments and technical systems. the coast guard is responsible for enforcement of card use. since the program was launched in 2007 in wilmington, delaware, we've conducted security threat assessments and issued cards to 2.9 million workers, including longshoremen, truckers and rail and vessel crews. and merchant mariners. the twic program is the first and largest federal program to issue a biometric credential. working closely with industry and our dhs partners, the program has evolved over the years to address concerns over the applicability of federal smart card best practices to a working maritime environment, such as the requirement for two
trips to an enrollment center for card enrollment and activation. tsa reformed the program by launching one visit in june of 2003 in alaska and michigan. this provides workers the option to receive their twic through the mail rather than requiring in-person pickup and activation. last month tsa moved from the pilot phase of the program to a phased implementation for all applicants. we have added call center capacity for applicants checking on their enrollment status. we've enabled web-based ordering for replacement cards. we've increased quality assurance at our enrollment centers. we've opened multi-program enrollment centers across the country to allow individuals to apply for the twic, that has the hazardous material endorsement and tsa precheck. we will expand a number of enrollment centers to over 300 this year, adding to the convenience of workers. tsa continues to evolve and modernize their credentialing programs through these initiatives, strong
collaboration at the department, partnership with industry and the support of this committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify today and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, mr. sadler. and now stephen caldwell, please proceed. >> thank you for asking us to testify on port security. we've issued almost 100 reports on port security since 9/11. our most recent comprehensive report on port security was issued in the fall of 2012 to note the ten-year anniversary of the maritime transportation security act. let's start with planning. there is a national strategy for maritime security issued in 2005. we reviewed that strategy and its eight supporting plans and found much of the criteria that gao has laid out for a good national strategy. we also looked at some of the more detailed functional strategies and in some cases we have found those to be wanting, but at the port level we found that some of the plans specific to the ports have included the
safe port act's requirement that they also cover recovery issues. again, going back to some of the functional plans, we found some deficiencies in those. for example, dhs after putting out the small vessel security strategy and laying out an implementation plan for that has not been tracking the progress of the components and actually meeting that, which leaves some opportunities, lack of disseminating any potential lessons learned or even being able to track their overall progress on that strategy. in terms of maritime domain awareness, there have been a number of improvements. the coast guard through its common operating picture program has allowed additional data sources into the use of the users, allowed blue force tracking, which is the ability to track our own vessels, and also increased access across the coast guard to other users. however, many of the original systems used to increase maritime domain awareness have fallen short of the capabilities that were originally planned for
those and mainly these are due to some of the acquisition problems that our reports have noted, such as not developing complete requirements at the beginning, not updating costs or schedule base lines and not monitoring their initial performance. regarding the security of our domestic ports, dhs components, especially the coast guard, have gone quite a ways in terms of implementing the maritime transportation security act. key provisions of that act call for security planning at the port facility and vessel level and it also calls for the coast guard to then inspect those facilities to make sure that those security activities are indeed in place. gao has audited those programs. we found progress and most of our recommendations in those areas have been implemented, but some areas remain problematic. as noted, we have concerns about the port security grant program
and the extent that they are monitoring the effectiveness of the actual projects. going back to 2005, gao found that the program lacked an adequate risk assessment process and lacked a mean to measure the effectiveness of the projects in the grants. more recent work did find that the grants are based on risk and it goes back to the process that was started to be described at both the port and national level. after more than a decade after the program's start there's really no performance measures in place to determine whether the program at the port or facility level has improved port security. and in many cases fema lacks project level visibility to know whether the projects were, indeed, implemented as described. regarding the global supply chain security, there's also been a lot of progress, especially by cbp. we've reviewed these programs and noted their management and operations have matured over time. we concur with cbp that implementing 100% scanning as
defined in the safe port act and 9/11 act is extremely challenging. however, we are less convinced that existing risk-based program does not have room for improvement. a recent report has found cbp has not been timely in terms of measuring the effectiveness of its targeting system or evaluating supply chain risks in foreign ports. including csi ports. we did see the may 5th letter from the secretary to you, mr. chairman, and note that both of those issues are discussed as potential improvements. in closing, gao will continue to review port security programs for congress, this committee and others. for example, we have ongoing work on port cyber security as well as the disposition of high-risk containers. that concludes my remarks and i'm happy to answer any questions. thank you. >> thanks so much for that testimony. senator ayotte, nice to see you. why don't you lead us off.
>> thank you, mr. chairman, appreciate it. i just wanted to get a follow-up, administrator sadler and certainly mr. caldwell about the twic program. so you testified about the one visit pilot and now it's going to a nationwide mailing system. so how do you assess it's going and are you able to do this without concerns about fraud? so just can you give us a quick update. you know, obviously i appreciate the steps you've taken on this but just in terms of substance. then i would like to hear from mr. caldwell about how effective you think overall the twic program is in helping protect port security and what other -- gao has been quite critical in past reports about what we need to do to improve this program and its effectiveness. so that's really the issue i was hoping to get a little more insight on. >> we started the pilot for twic 1 visit last year in 2012-2013
in alaska and michigan. as we transitioned to our new technical system, we started the implementation nationwide, so we started implementing the one visit in may of this year, may 12th. so we planned to have a phased schedule to implement it across the nation and we should have it done by this summer. so we think it's going fairly well. we do mail the cards out. i believe we've got about 3,000 cards for twic 1 visit that have been mailed out of about 5,000 enrollments. what we do is send the card out separately and then we send the pin in a different letter. so we try to send them out in two different letters. >> so you haven't seen fraud yet on that program? >> on the mailing itself? >> yeah. >> not yet, senator, but we're still in the early stages. of the implementation. >> thank you. and mr. caldwell, i know we're sort of in the middle of a vote so i just wanted to get a quick
thought on one of the things i think we've worried on overall about the twic program, is it making us more secure. are we improving this system so that we can have some reliability with it? >> well, two things. i'll talk about twic 1 and that's trade opportunity, security and convenience. definitely it's more convenient but you're losing one of your steps of internal controls of identifying the person's identity by having them come in. i think congress pretty much directed and took to going that direction. >> they did. >> so it is what it is. >> but it's also good to follow up and make sure that we didn't -- that the choice we made there, that i was obviously a supporter of, that we made sure we're following up on it as well. >> yes. i do think it's a good idea to follow up on that to see if there is fraud and whether that
happens. >> what i'm worried about overall is are we really doing anything with twic? i'm not trying to be funny about this. i get the goal of it, it makes sense, but we obviously -- the concern has been how are we enhancing port security overall? >> we have those concerns as well. we've had concerns with the program pretty much from day one in a lot of ways it was implemented. for example, the reader pilot that was done recently, we thought the valuation of that was done quite poorly and left out a lot of things that would be able to evaluate really what were the problems coming up. was it the card itself, was it the reader, was it the person that was manning the security gate when they did their test at the reader pilot. they did not include the kind of detailed data you'd need to know to get that. obviously you know there's some concerns in terms of the
shooting down in norfolk. >> yes, that was raised in the commerce committee. >> and the navy now is not accepting twic, at least by itself, as a card accepting to get on that base so obviously they have some concerns with it. there's been an assertion that twic has improved security and we've seen that in the latest report to congress but we haven't seen strong evidence supporting it. >> so you want better metrics. and you want -- >> gao always wants better metrics, but yes. i suspect we'll be asked to look at it again. >> are we doing better? that's a good question, are we doing better? >> well, compared to nothing, having a pass that is used in multiple places with the background check is useful. you can have felons and things have things waived so they still have those cards, but you don't have people getting the cards that have either espionage against the u.s. or terrorism crimes. those kinds of things. that's a pretty high bar, but in one other way to look at it -- >> yes, that would be important.
>> twic was put in as part of mtsa, which really the bar for mtsa is will they prevent a major transportation security incident and that's where this kind of a judgment call about whether someone getting and committing a crime, committing murder, would that rise to the level of a transportation security incident. not likely. >> if there's anything else you want to add, i know we've got to run to vote. >> just quickly. the first thing i want to say for twic 1 visit you have to go in and confirm your identity -- >> the first time, absolutely. >> you've got to do that. the other thing i'd say is that this is the first time that the maritime population has been defined. prior to twic, there was no definition as far as i know and i spent 20 years going in and out of ports, so i'm not sure who knew nationally -- >> who was going in and out of the ports. >> we now know that example. >> we now have a population of 3 million people. i vetted people before twic with information that was submitted by ports.
we vetted 900,000 people. we did that prior to the implementation of twic as a mitigation strategy. now we're up to 3 million people. the first thing is define the population, we recurrently vet them every single day. we have one common standard, put the biometric aside, one common standard, one common credential, one common background check. that didn't happen prior across the country. some places you had to buy a multiple credential within the same state so if you went to one port, you had to buy a credential and you went to another port, you had to buy another credential. and i can't tell you what the background check was. so we think there is improvement in security just by virtue of the fact of those things that i just mentioned. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm going to slip out, run and vote and then come back and so dr. coburn can go back and forth. i want to telegraph my pitch, when i come back, i'll be interested in asking so you can be thinking about them are how do we measure success. i want to see if there's consensus on how we measure success.
and if there's some consensus around common metrics, then how are we doing. what are we doing especially well, what are we not doing so well. and finally i always like to ask what can we do to help, all right? dr. coburn, thank you, all. >> thank you. have fun voting. let's keep talking about twic for a minute. we hit -- i'd just like your assessment on somebody with a twic card that gets into a port and shoots people. how's that happen? no system is perfect and i'm not laying blame. i'm just saying how did we miss that? >> at the time that individual was vetted, senator, the standard for manslaughter included all manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary. so when the individual came through, the crime had been committed in 2005. the conviction occurred in 2008.
i believe he served about 800 days on his conviction. so he served about two and a half years. he was released from incarceration in 2011. we encountered him in december of 2013. and based on the standards that we were using at the time, that voluntary manslaughter charge was not a disqualifier. so he got his card in january of 2014. as far as him using the card at the base, i would defer to d.o.d., but one point i have to make is the twic in and of itself does not give you access to a port. you have to have the twic and you have to have a business need. so we've gone back, we're scrubbing all the cases we had for disqualifications that involve involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter and we've changed our policy now that if you come in with a voluntary manslaughter charge, that's an interim disqualifier. interim meaning that you are still eligible to appeal, you're
still eligible to request a waiver, you're still eligible to request an administrative law judge review and you're eligible to go to court if you don't agree with the finding that we make. >> right. that's the kind of answer i was wanting. talk to me about twic readers. >> i'll defer to my colleague in the coast guard, but to senator carper's point about what we can do to increase security and how we can be more successful, that's one way to be more successful is by implementing the twic readers because we have a biometric credential. we believe that it works. right now it's being used as a visual identification card. but it needs to be used as a biometric credential and on a risk-based basis as well. so we believe that it's critically important to install readers in ports. >> admiral?
>> thank you, doctor. i really appreciate the opportunity to answer that question because as the agency responsible for implementing security at our port facilities and as a previous captain at port myself, i think it's important to recognize that twic and the twic reader are part of a greater access control system for a facility which has its own security system, which is in itself part of a greater system to secure our ports than the entire chain that i discussed. so when you're going to put an access control system in a facility, you're going to include fences, gates, guards, lights, cameras, a credential of some sort and in some cases a biometric reader for that credential so it's just a matter of layering the security. as the chairman noted in his opening comments, if this was security at all costs, we'd have readers everywhere. because we are trying to balance, as we should, the risk with the benefit and facilitate commerce, we've done an exhaustive analysis, which i'm happy to explain to you, that has ensured that the readers go
at the highest-risk facilities. and i think that the coast guard's proposed rule puts those readers where the cost benefit is currently the best. i think as we expand the use of twic and twic-like credentials beyond the maritime domain, because that's the only place we have transportation credentials, reader costs will come down, card costs will come down and the cost benefit will change in a way that it just makes sense to put readers at more facilities. >> do you have a proposed first round will be completed date and an assessment made? -- of twic readers? we are currently working on the rule we put out a notice proposed rule making. we received about 2600 comment. we are working through the comments. we are going to make some adjustments to the rules and go through the process and hopefully sometime next year. there is a two-year implementation date. >> we're 2 1/2 years from the present plan of the coast guard?
>> two and a half years where readers will be required at certain port facilities. >> thank you. let me go back for a minute. miss mcclain, one of your statements in your opening statement was spending money in a cost effective way. if you have metrics on the effectiveness of grant money spent, how do you know it's effective? >> senator, i think that the -- i appreciate the question. i think it's a little outside my lane. i would prefer to take the question back and get you an answer working with my colleague from fema on where we are in
developing metrics or answering that particular question. >> i don't think anybody can dispute that we with did good with the money we spent. i'm not saying that. i'm just saying. anybody can answer this. we have a port system where we tier risks, and the vast majority of money have gone tier one ports. and under the system you're utilizing today without any recognition of the money that is already spent, we continue to spend the same money on the same risk. there's no risk reduction recognized in your tiering. if you don't have metrics, associated with the money being spent, the port security program, grant program when do we stop spending money at tier one ports.
in other words, how much is enough? and how do we know when we've got the best cost-benefit analysis. the most cost effective program in based on the risk and mitigation and the other goal that we have. how do we know that? if we don't have a metric-based system? in other words, here is why we're spending the $2.9 million. here is what we're hoping to get. here is how we're going to measure if we've got it. there's all sorts of -- i won't in the hearing, i will privately, give you the list of money that you spent on stuff that a common-sense person would say it doesn't have anything to do with port security. we have two ports in oklahoma, and we have two 27-foot boats on the river, and in terms of the risk associated with those ports, those are low priority compared to what the higher priority things are on the port. those two ports. so my question is, if we don't have metrics to measure.
when we look at this in total. i think we have done a wonderful job in laying it out. how do we know? how do we know when to quit spending money that gives us a diminishing return on the port security grant program? >> senator, i'm happy to field that question. improved measurement is absolutely an area where we see a lot of opportunity. >> let me interrupt you. what is your measurement now? >> in fy 13, we -- for the first time, instituted measures related to sustainment of existing capabilities versus building new ones. we took the gao and mr. caldwell's reports and recommendations quite seriously and are looking closely at what ports are doing with the funding. we -- for the first time in the fy 14 application cycle are requesting project level data
going in. you are probably aware of the history of the program, and the flexibility that had been given at the local level against area of maritime security plans. there remains a lot of flexibility, but we are increasing the oversight to request project level data upfront so we can start to get that information to form even more effective measures of outcomes. on the grants management side, senator, we certainly have measures now, and even over fy 12 measures of our monitoring. mr. caldwell mentioned the level of monitoring. 100% the port security grants undergo some level of monitoring. we have a tiered monitoring system where our program staff on our routine basis look at every award, look at the history
of the grantee, the history of the outcomes achieved, their financial measures from draw down, rate of expenditure, rate of obligation. that, then, is reviewed. we do prioritize based on the risk we see in their management of the grants all the way up to desk reviews where we request a lot of information from grantees and site visits. what i would tell you, senator, i look forward to continue working with you and continue to get the data we need to form more effective measures. i agree with you that everybody can point to the examples, and they really are some stunning camp -- examples of how useful and effective it is. we will continue to refine our measures to get that data. >> yeah.
as i noted, i think it's improved. i think we still, you know, my underlying concern somebody is going to be sitting up here ten years from now and the amount of money spent on the type of program isn't going to be there. so how we spend the money today is really important. because there's going to come a time, i mean, you know, i'll repeat for you. social security, disability runs out of money at the end of next year. medicare runs out of money in '26. social security runs out of money in '32. by 2030, the entire budget will be consumed to medicare, medicaid, social security, and the interest on the federal debt. my question, based on the future, and if we spend money really well now, we won't spend -- we won't need to be spending money in the future. that's the basis of the question.
it's not a criticism. it's just that we need the best cost-benefit value for every dollar you send out in a port security grant. >> we agree with you, and we are working with our partners on the vulnerable index, which is one of the things you mentioned. how do we understand what risk we have bought down, and we'll continue to look at that to make sure we're spending the money as effectively as possible. >> thank you. admiral, one of my concerns, and i can't go into detail, but let me give you a hypothetical. you give me the answer. let say somebody leaves one of our certified ports overseas, and arrives here. in between there and now, something was added to that cargo. do we have the capability to know that? >> well, doctor, i'm not exactly sure. it if they leave a foreign port. >> one of our certified ports. meeting all the requirements that you all have.
and someplace between when they left and when they arrive at the port of los angeles somebody has added a package. if that occurred -- >> so -- >> not in the port. just in transit. >> in transit. the only way -- a couple of things would need happen. probably the entire crew would have to be complacent with the individual securing it. it's difficult to access particularly a container in transit without a significant amount of effort, and that would require probably more than one person. >> let's don't worry about the details of that. let's say it happens. >> if it happens the only way we would know, really, it's a better question for my colleague from customs and border protection would be because the container has been opened and we would be able to determine that. maybe you can --
>> sure. senator, we have two elements i think would be germane here. one the import security filing giving us the stow plan for the vessel. we know where each container is on the vessel. whether it's assessable during a voyage or not. we see drug smuggler attempt to break the custom seal, put a load inside the door of the container and lock it up. it's only doable around the deck area. we know which containers could be accessed and we do routine seal checks upon arrival. to see if they have been tampered with or the doors opened. there are different steps in our -- >> somebody counterfeit your seal? can somebody counterfeit your seal? >> they can try to, yes. we have detected dozens of attempts to do that pretty effectively. >> so they not have been able to do that as of yet? >> i won't say, senator -- >> that you're aware of.
>> successful counterfeit attempts. we train our personnel to detect what our seals are supposed to look like. whether they've been tampered with. there's a number of sequences and other kind of safe guards in this process. >> i'll just -- this is a long time ago, but i'll share an experience with you. i bought a company in puerto rico, put it into four containers, all the equipment. everything that was there. all four container arrived at one of my plants here. all the seals were there. when we opened the containers, everything of significant value that could have been marketed was gone. but the seals were still there. so the fact is, and that was way before 9/11. that was in the '70s. but the fact is, that people will try to do it.
so my question is, is -- i guess my question is really this, do we have the capability to track ships from the time they leave a port until the time arrive here and know whether or not they've been boarded or accessed between this embarkment and the embark here? >> that's the question that i probably can't answer. >> got you. all right. thank you. >> senator, did you want me to touch upon the metrics issue? >> yes please. >> i think at the strategic level. a more detailed functional plan, we have not seen metrics laid out early as to what the end state is and how we're going to measure that. but we have seen problems particularly at the program level, most often, those are easier to look for and find. i think we have found an
improvement of the metrics of how the programs are run. one of the first things we do when we look at the program, do you know how the program is being run and have those metric. a lot of times we'll find weaknesses in the internal controls. i think those are improved across the board. when i see some of the programs that have matured. a lot is better management of the program. where we have not seen large improvements is in the area of actually measuring results of the program and what they're trying to achieve. i would also agree with you the importance of cost-benefit analysis. a lot of times we'll get a discussion from the agency that could be expensive and we don't have enough money to do it. in the end if you spend $3 billion on grants. it's an outstanding record for nine years they come up with performance measures on the port security grant. so maybe a couple of extra millions to do the analysis.
in the hindsight it might be money well spent. one example of cost-benefit analysis that was done rigorously involves the advanced portals d.o.d. put in. the first ones they put in was light -- it was not very rigorous in terms of the testing. we pointed that out. when they did the rigorous testing, and then they looked at how much they would cost marginally compared to the additional they get. they cancelled the program after spending $280 million. eventually they were planning to spend, like, $3 billion. it was the case where whatever the testing or analysis cost, i think in the end, lead to a good result.
>> okay. let me ask mr. kamoie. you all plans to reinsert the fiduciary agents to -- >> we do not, senator. >> why is that? >> when the fiduciary agent model was used, it was at time when the appropriations levels for the program were much higher. after realms of stimulus funding, the agent model was absolutely necessary to assist the agency in distributing and monitoring the funds. over time, however, as the appropriations level has gone down, and our internal capability with staffing has
increased to manage the program, the fiduciary agent model has become less necessary. and in terms of monitoring performance, there was a varying level of performance by fiduciary agents and monitoring. given our increased staffing, our increased capabilities, we think it's more appropriate that we monitor an oversight and grant funding and how it's spent. the other thing i'll say is that the allow ability of management and administrative costs from the grant program to fiduciary agents of 3 to 5%, would result, for example, just this year in 3 to $5 million in overhead costs that we think are better invested in actual port security projects. >> do you have the flexibility to use some of the grant money for grant management? >> senator, i'll have to check the language and get back with you.
>> would it help you. in other words, rather than spending 3 to $5 million. if we spend it on managing grants, especially cost effectiveness of grants. and looking at that, i'm pleased with the progress that is being made. i don't think we're there yet. i would love know what we need to do to help you to be able to get to the point. my model for grants, at the federal government is a vision of library and museum sciences. if you get a grant from them, you can guarantee they're going check on you. they're going do a metric, they're going to know whether you followed your plan and the grant. if you're not, they pull it. you don't ever get another one again. so everybody has a different expectations. the fact that some grant money is going to things that aren't really for security. you know, if you had the reputation, i guarantee everybody would be put down the way you put down. even though you have flexibility.
>> absolutely i'll take a look at that. we're willing to learn lessons. >> it's the best-run grant program in the federal government. >> i appreciate that. the other thing is the spend down. we're still, in terms of, we granted but we still a lot ways to go. where are we on that? is it because these are long-term programs? that's getting better as well. early on in the program when ports were doing larger capital project infrastructure building with multiphase complicated projects, it took a long time to spend down a lot of projects have been completed. we've taken a number of steps to assist grantees in the spend down. one, we remind them quarterly. we're in touch. we've shortened the period of grants to two years.
but your question was where are we? in august of '12, for -- and we follow up in writing with these numbers, but for the program years, '08 to '11, 80% of the available funds were not yet drawn down. a year later, for fy 8-12. of course every year one goes off the books. we move the needle down to 44% of funds not being drawn down, and we did a check at the end of april. right now we're at 39.3%. not yet drawn down from '08 to '13.
>> i'll have to recess. senator carper will be back in a moment. >> thank you, senator. let see if we can see if there's any consensus on the metrics that we're using. how do we measure success. let start with you, miss mcclain. what are the metrics we are using and ought to be using. how are we doing? >> mr. chairman -- i think there is several -- there are several indicators that evidence and success in securing the ports. i would note in the last seven years, our relationships are programs internationally, those
global partnerships, the capacity building, the agreements, everything that is necessary to supply the whole global supply chain. i think there's been suggest advancements in that area. i also think that our improvements in the advanced data and targeting area make us more secure. coast guards, port assessments 1500 ports. we think there are a lot of indicators that there's a global recognition of the need to tackle this issue on a broader basis. >> all right. >> same question to admiral paul. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i was in port in galveston, texas for 2001 and the three years we followed, we scrambled to figure out what it meant to
secure our ports. from my perspective, it's clear we've achieved a lot. i think one the first things we did, mr. caldwell mentioned the strategies. we recognized in order to build a secure port we had to build regime locally, nationally, and internationally. we had to build awareness so we could figure out what was going on and pick anomalies. we need the capability to respond to the anomalies. if you look at the three building blocks and compare them to where they were in september 11, 2001. it's clear there are progresses. there are clear metrics with each of those. with regard to the regimes, thank you to the congress for the maritime transportation security act and the safe port act. it was the impetus for the national regime as well as regimes that have now been implemented as far down as individual port authorities. i'm not just talking about regimes required by the law. i'm talking about they understand a security is part of the business product.
i think in that regard there's clear measures. really intangible from here to see. i can tell you there was no awareness or recognition that security really was parking lot -- part of the product in the port. we got the message across with safety and environment. they get it as part of the business as well. i think there's a metric there. certainly with regard to awareness and capability. we have built the capabilities federally, locally, internationally. all of which, i think, are clear evidence that we've been effective in terms of enhancing it. i'm with you. i think we need to do more. i'm concerned about emerging threats like cyber. we need to develop some metrics there. >> we'll come back and finish. how are we doing, what are we doing, what metrics are we using, how do we demonstrate to
what we're doing better. i want to come back and say what is on the to-do list, first. >> mr. chairman, i'll touch on five areas. broadly, our ability to identify and mitigate risk is the metric we seek to measure ourselves on. first, on the data front, as was alluded to. we're getting advanced information on cargo shipments. manifest information, entry information, and import security filing. in terms of targeting and assessing that risk, category two, we're analyzing it with the automated targeting system, we think it's a sophisticated capability is constantly approved and currently working on responding to the ideas on identifying the effectiveness of those targets with more granularity. three, examining the earliest possible point in the cycle. currently 85% of the shipments we identify as high risk are examined before they leave for the u.s. our examination in the 58 ports are accepted 99 percent of the time. we think those are very solid metrics. 100% of the containers
identified as potentially high risk are examined before they are let into the u.s. stream of commerce. 85% prior of leading and the rest of the 15% before allowed to enter the u.s. on arrival. securing the supply chain, category four. over 50% of all cargo containers are part of the partnership with our 10,750 partners. we've increased the security supply chain through the partnership. we're recognizing other country systems including the european union and six other agreements to ensure broader visibility globally as ellen alluded to, the international partnership. and five, our efforts to address the highest consequence threats. we're scanning 99.8% of all arriving containerized cargo. >> say that again. >> 99.8%. so just about everything in
arriving in sea port is skeined through a radiation port monitor. the other part of this coin, sir, the facilitation piece you have referenced. vast majority of cargo arriving in the u.s. is released before it touches the dock. our ct partners are getting fewer examples because they secure the supply chain. we establish mobile technology for agricultural to clear shipments on the dock instead of waiting hours and having the bananas sit. the u.s. chamber of commerce and 71 others wrote to the secretary this week in an open letter saying the regime is working well and that the facilitation piece in particular, we've achieved through the layered risk approach. those are the metrics we look at. happy to elaborate on any specifics. >> mr. chairman, i think while you were out we agreed in the port security grant programs we have measures and made progress. we agree question continue to make progress.
on the program attic side of the effectiveness measures, we look very carefully at the six priorities of the grant program. enhancing maritime marine awareness, explosive device detection, chemical explosive pretext, response, and recovery capabilities, enhancing cybersecurity capabilities, maritime security risk, mitigation prompts, planning, training exercises, and the transportation worker identification credential implementation. right now we have a measure we're looking at building new capabilities across those six areas, and sustaining existing capabilities. but, again, that measure can be better. on the administrative management side, we've made progress in measuring our ability to effectively, efficiently release the funding, monitor programmatic use of the funds, monitor grantee financial management of the funds, monitor the closing of the awards and
grantee draw down. we're making progress, mr. chairman, we've got an opportunity to make even more. >> thanks. >> seven? the >> yes, sir. for us, i think it's about getting good, quality information and data for us to make the right decisions on when we issue a card. it's about continuing to get that information after we issue the cards so we can monitor the individual to ensure they haven't done something as to disqualify them. whether it's on a terrorism watch list or something through a criminal issue. i think the other thing that is going to make us better is installing readers. we believe that the coast guard, whom we're close partners with, made the right decision to take a risk-based approach and put readers where they need to be. and that -- we think that's going to be a measure in our program for our program considering it's a biometric credential. i think the last thing is share information.
which we do on a daily basis. so we need good, quality information to make good decisions with. we need the information to keep on coming so we can continue to make good decisions after we issue the credential. we need to install readers. and we need to continue to share information, which we do on a daily basis with our parter ins. >> mr. caldwell? >> thank you very much. i mean, the most difficult question is how do you measure security and risk? i think we have actually looked at that quite a bit across a lot of these programs. i think one of the better problems we found is coast guard program called maritime security risk analysis model where they can, at the facility level, try to measure the risk-based on vulnerabilities and threats and various scenarios. like that, i think they did that. coast guard also took a step trying to develop a more sophisticated measure of how much coast guard programs actually reduce risks in the port environment. and so was the percentage
reduction of maritime security risk subject to coast guard influence in the programs, and we're critical of this. in the end, it was subject matter x person. the coast guard sitting down and thinking about what the reductions measures are and then putting the single point of, you know, percentage on that. we had couple of criticisms in terms of way maybe trying to make it better and maybe give particularly so much judgment. you want to give a range instead of a point estimate like that. but i don't want to criticize the coast guard in the sense they certainly were trying to think larger about the suite of programs and what extend they reduce risk. whether they want to keep the measure or not is something they're looking at. it was a measure they were using within the coast guard. they weren't really using it for that much. if you have a performance measure but you're not really using it to monitor things or prioritize resources, you got to kind of question whether it's a useful metric in the end. >> thank you. okay. some of you began to answer the
second part of my question. i want to take another shot at it. my staff, my colleagues, we oftentimes say these words, the road to improvement is always under construction. that's true here as well. i just want to -- in terms of thinks of metrics, but thinking we're making progress but areas we're not making nearly enough. there's been some allusion to this. we can actually measure we've not made nearly enough. are any of those. who can help enable us to make the progress? us, the legislative branchs committee, the president and his budget? who needs to help out? ellen? >> yes, i think that just to sort of set the scene here, we certainly need an approach that
is flexible, innovative, so question take on the adaptive adversary. we need something that an approach that is risk-based so we can make the most cost-effective use of our resources. that said, we recognize not that we don't want to have -- negative impacts on global trade, so we are looking in the near-term to specific improvements in the area of the targeting algorithms, the reducing the alarms. working with our partners at some of the csi ports to increase the percentage of scanning that is undertaken. we're looking at, i think it's a key point that i hope doesn't get lost in today's discussion, looking across all pathways. focussing on a single pathway doesn't necessarily reduce overall risks. so as we go forward, we need to
consider improving security across all transportation pathways. and lastly, i would note that we are continuing the dialogue with stakeholders to see what additional or expanded roles they might take in improving security of ports. >> thanks. admiral? >> i think there's a couple of areas. the first is complacency. as we get further from 9/11 the sense of urgency decreases. from the congress to the security guard at the facility. we have to make sure we maintain the sense of urgency with regard to port security. the threat is adaptive. as good as physical security systems we have in place are, there are emerging threats like cyber that we have not yet addressed. we have begun to address them. i believe the coast guard has the authorities we need to do
with that. we're working on what the resources might be. so you may hear about that. the other area that would be of concern is the real high-end threat that needs to be intercepted offshore. we need to maintain and get out there and do something about some unidentified threat for our shore. it requires ships, helicopters, and people not only able to get there and present at the time when you need them. so those two things are areas where we need to make sure continue to build our capability and our plans for action. >> okay, thank you. kevin? >> mr. chairman, i would echo a couple of comments that ellen made. on the targeting side, there's always an opportunity to improve or analytics and capability to assess risk. we're pursuing it aggressively. we have a good system for taking in current intelligence, manipulating the data elements against it and identifying risk. we want to get better. it's an area we get congressional support to continue to improve in that area. but the radiation portal monitors. we need to be able to dial the algorithms. they're sensitive for the threat
materials we're worried about. they reduce the naturally occurring radiological alarms we face on normal commodities like bananas, for instance, that hit on the monitor. we don't want to waste time on the alarms. we want to focus on what potentially could be dangerous terrible. i think there are continued opportunities globally. security first. we are looking another other threats to the global supply chain, contraband that can support criminal activity and so forth. enhancing global supply chain security standards. we did that after 9/11 with the world custom organization and the safe framework of standards. there's always opportunities to take it to the next level and to build capacity with those governments and custom services that are willing to step forward but don't have the capacity or funding. and then, of course, the private sector. continued opportunities there
not only supply chain side but looking at whether from a terminal perspective there might be a return on investment prior to leaving from a private perspective that we could share and benefit in. we're pursuing all of these angles as the secretary noted in his letter. >> those are great points. i appreciate your responses. i'll come back and ask the same question of the last three witnesses. i'll be right back. >> you want them to answer those? >> i'll be back. >> okay. okay. thank you. let's talk about the 100% mandate. and the fact we're at 2 to 4%. i think those numbers are right. please correct me if i'm wrong. ngo, i would love for you to get in on this. there's no question the 9/11 commission said report security we need 100% screening. we hear it's not practical. so the question somewhere between 2 to 4% and 100%, where do we need to be.
how do we need to decide where we need to be, how do we become more effective in terms of container inspection? admiral? the kevin? >> senator. i'll start i'm sure colleagues will want to chime in. on the 100% mandate, i think the key question for us is not the percentage itself, but are we inspecting the right percentage? is it -- are we inspecting and identifying the containers high risk and mitigating that threat at the earliest possible point. while you had to step out to vote, senator, we talked about the metrics we're following and whether we're accomplishing that. i would like to reiterate one of the elements for you. on the containers that we identify as potentially high risk through automated targeting system, we are currently examining with our foreign partners under the container security initiative 85% of those containers before they are on a vessel destined for the u.s.
within that -- >> that's 15% that aren't getting inspected. >> they are getting inspected fully at the first port of arrival in the united states. we are checking them before they enter the stream of commerce to arrival and we are checking them before they enter the stream of commerce to the u.s. and 85% on a ship discontinued to the u.s. >> if the 15%, if one has a nuclear weapon it's a little late, isn't it? >> yes, that's not the only layer -- >> i understand. when we think about this, you're saying of those deemed high risk, so what is our goal to get to the 100% of those deemed high risk? >> our goal there sir is to increasingly target to right ports how we can encourage them anything we think is high risk. so we have 58 csi ports covering 80% of cargo destined for the
u.s. we think we placed those in the right places and we're assessing how the threats have changed and are there certain strategically important -- can we work with additional measures. also just mentioning as you came in, working with terminal operators in the private sector. way to increase the overall inspect if they think there's a return on investment working with customers to sell a security benefit that we can then benefit from and share in the information also? >> any comments on that? >> the container inspection world really does belong to customs and border protection although it can certainly attest to the impracticality of looking at every container as it comes through our yard. i have seen the targeting we do jointly on cargo and the automated processing are effective and adaptable. if there's a new intel stream
that comes in, they can change targeting and identify cargo that might be associated with a newly identified threat. >> all right. so here's the question as a common sense okie. we say it's not capable to do 100% screening. where's the cost breakdown? >> number of studies in that regard have been done eni would offer the gao may want to comment. we've done a study and several to congress estimating up to 16 billion in cost. european union has done a study and private sector has done several studies. the challenge is there's 800 or so initial ports for containerized for the u.s. and average of 5 million to implement this kind of system prior to waiting in each lane.
that scope makes it very challenging to get to the level. a lot of question on who pays and how it's monitored and so forth. >> if you take the rand study, even though it's dated now and if one sneaks in and you have a tragedy that they spoke about at the port of los angeles, $16 billion doesn't seem that great. so where do we go, gao? >> senator, thank you. so i thought about this a lot. we've done several studies on it. as far as the one study you're asking for, the only place i've seen it is in a recommendation we've made. and i think that cbp and the department would have been better off if they said this is the feasibility study and this is cost benefit analysis. we're going to do it and put this thing to bed or show what the tradeoffs are. there have been multiple studies
they've done. i feel bad because i think the department in all of the little pieces they've done since then have almost gotten there. but i don't see that. i just would like to stop to talk about kind of one popular myth that 9/11 commission never called for the 100 scanning of maritime cargo. >> what did they call for? >> 100% scanning of air cargo. they said almost nothing about ports in in maritime. >> that's great to know. >> but moving on -- the safe port act left a lot of things undefined and they tried to understand what the undefined things would be in terms of cost, who does it and what's the point. but i think there's a concern
that it would create a false sense of security in a couple of ways. you could scan a container if it's kind of within a regime that we trust, a port that we trust and we know maybe that container we have some confidence that after it scanned and gets on that ship, it's going to be monitored or something like that. a lot of the places because of our ports laid out where they do the scanning is offsite. if that truck has to drive, a lot can happen in that period. one thing the coast guard said that he thought it was more likely a weapon of mass destruction would come in not through a kind of highly regulated regime like containers but through small vessel snuck in some other way. i also agree that intelligence in the end will be the key if there is weapons of mass destruction that someone is trying to smuggle in here. i'm not sure they would catch
that because they've looked at probably millions and millions of containers use risk base analysis. it's not like when they find drugs in these things that there's a one to one match between oh, that was -- we rated that one high risk. there are cases where they find stuff that had gotten through their system, drugs or other contraband. i think our approach has been to look at the programs that we would have liked to have seen the feasibility analysis and i think that's kind of water under the bridge. but woed like to see doing better with what we have recognizing that we're not going to have a perfect system. that's going to be optimizing your targeting system that means you're monitoring it on a regular basis and testing it to see how it's doing and then having the best csi footprint you can in the ports they are in right now are not high risk
ports. maybe they should pack up and shake hands with those partners and they'll keep helping us but move those operations to other ports. >> do you have specific recommendations on ports from the gao? >> yes, we do. we have a recommendation that they use the port risk model they used in 2009 to initially plan 100% scan in thinking about that and use a similar type model, what ports are they in? we tried to reproduce that and found 12 of the ports they were in were low risk ports. half of the csi were in high risk ones but rerecognize that there is some ports that won't let us in. >> we've got -- not going to let a joint u.s. program into their -- we have joint recommendations and i'm not sure i can disclose details of individual ports but there is movement in terms of additional csi ports, both opening and
closing. >> let's go back to grants and the tiered port system for a minute. if we're not doing analysis on progress, do we re-evaluate ports in terms of tiers, here's tier one, two, three, four, is that done routinely, yearly or biannually. how often do we reanalyze high risk ports, number one? number two, without metrics but they are getting better. how do we take what we have improved and measure it to show a decreased risk for tier one port so the dollars you have can go to where the risks are the greatest. >> we reassess the risk of the
nation's ports every year and we -- we use the risk formula that incorporates the most recent data we have available on threat vulnerability and consequence. and there have been times where changes in that risk data have resulted in the changes in the grouping of ports. for example, last year in fy 13 there are eight tier one ports and san diego had a change in its relative risk formula because they are relative to one another. this year it is not a tier one port. we are making those adjustments and work very closely with the department's intelligence and analysis unit to pop you late the risk with the most recent data. so yes, we are looking at that continually. your second question as to what the measurement and what i would
consider to be buying down of that risk and vulnerability, i agree we've got some progress to make there in terms of agreement on measurements and metrics to show that progress and show it in a way -- when the chairman comes back, his question was about how can the congress help. and here i think i might ask of the chairman and you, senator, is that we have a continued dialogue about the types of data that would enable you to have more confidence and the american people have more confidence that we are making that progress and that we are being effective stew ards of the taxpayer dollars. i agree we have made progress and have good examples but we would like to continue to work with you to get at the data